CVE Alert: CVE-2025-38352 – Linux – Linux

CVE-2025-38352

UnknownNo exploitation known

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del() If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand(). If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won’t be able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or lock_task_sighand() will fail. Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this. This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail anyway in this case.

CVSS v3.1 not provided
Vendor
Linux, Linux
Product
Linux, Linux
Versions
0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt 78a4b8e3795b31dae58762bc091bb0f4f74a2200 | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt c076635b3a42771ace7d276de8dc3bc76ee2ba1b | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt 2f3daa04a9328220de46f0d5c919a6c0073a9f0b | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt 764a7a5dfda23f69919441f2eac2a83e7db6e5bb | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt 2c72fe18cc5f9f1750f5bc148cf1c94c29e106ff | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt c29d5318708e67ac13c1b6fc1007d179fb65b4d7 | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt 460188bc042a3f40f72d34b9f7fc6ee66b0b757b | 0bdd2ed4138ec04e09b4f8165981efc99e439f55 lt f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca | 2.6.36 | 0 lt 2.6.36 | 5.4.295 lte 5.4.* | 5.10.239 lte 5.10.* | 5.15.186 lte 5.15.* | 6.1.142 lte 6.1.* | 6.6.94 lte 6.6.* | 6.12.34 lte 6.12.* | 6.15.3 lte 6.15.* | 6.16 lte *
CWE
Unspecified
Vector
n a
Published
2025-07-22T08:04:25.277Z
Updated
2025-09-03T03:55:33.291Z

AI Summary Analysis

Risk verdict

High risk to systems running affected Linux kernels; no confirmed exploitation yet, but the local TOCTOU race warrants prompt patching when feasible.

Why this matters

The race between timer handling and timer deletion can enable a local attacker to corrupt timer state, potentially leading to privilege escalation or kernel instability. With a high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability and no user interaction required, compromised hosts or multi-tenant environments are at elevated risk once local access is gained.

Most likely attack path

An attacker already on the host with local access could attempt a timing-based race against POSIX CPU timer code, triggering inconsistent states or failures in task sighandling. Exploitation is technically complex (high attack complexity) and requires aligning handle_posix_cpu_timers with concurrent timer deletion, but it does not require user interaction. Lateral movement is limited by the local-attack vector, but compromised hosts could be pivot points in larger environments.

Who is most exposed

Servers, cloud/hypervisor hosts and containerised workloads running affected kernel versions are most exposed; embedded or desktop deployments using older or unpatched kernels in the affected range are also at risk.

Detection ideas

  • Kernel oops/panics or warning messages in dmesg related to posix_cpu_timers or lock_task_sighand.
  • Unusual task termination or reaping patterns around exiting threads.
  • Anomalies in timer-related syscalls or heavy timer churn under load.
  • Post-mortem crash dumps referencing timer_del or sighand paths.
  • Audit logs showing mismatches in timer state transitions.

Mitigation and prioritisation

  • Apply the patched kernel version from your distribution and verify the fix is present.
  • If rebuilding is required, enable relevant config (where feasible) such as TASK_WORK variants that mitigate this race.
  • Enforce strict local access controls; apply least-privilege policies to services/processes that can interact with timer APIs.
  • Implement compensating controls: endpoint hardening, container isolation, and monitoring for abnormal timer activity.
  • Plan a staged patch deployment with validation in a test environment; communicate downtime and rollback procedures.

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