CVE Alert: CVE-2025-41390 – Truffle Security Co. – TruffleHog

Risk verdict

High risk: a PoC exists for a locally exploitable arbitrary-code-execution flaw in the git handling of the affected tool, requiring user interaction.

Why this matters

In development and CI workflows, the tool is often invoked on local hosts or build runners. A malicious repository could trigger code execution within the tool’s process, risking host compromise, credential exposure, and pipeline integrity. The impact is high across confidentiality, integrity, and availability if the attacker can persist or pivot from a compromised build environment.

Most likely attack path

An attacker with local access or a prepared foothold targets a host running the tool. By supplying a specially crafted repository and inducing user interaction to process it, code executes within the tool’s context. Lateral movement hinges on the tool’s access to credentials or tokens within the host or CI environment; given no privileges are required, an already-privileged-but-local user could facilitate broader impact.

Who is most exposed

Developers, build runners, and CI pipelines that automate repository scanning or analysis are most at risk, especially where the tool runs with broad permissions or within shared build agents.

Detection ideas

• Unusual process activity when the tool processes repositories (new or unexpected child processes).
• Execution of commands or scripts originating from repository contents.
• Sudden spikes in memory/CPU during repo analysis or abnormal file writes.
• Network activity or token access changes during/after analysis.
• Logs showing attempts to execute code triggered by repository data.

Mitigation and prioritisation

• Patch promptly: upgrade to a non-affected version or apply vendor-provided fixes; verify patch availability in change-log.
• Run analysis in sandboxed environments (containers) with restricted file-system and network access; isolate CI/build agents.
• Enforce least-privilege: run the tool under a restricted service account; separate build tooling from sensitive credentials.
• Restrict sources and signing: only process repositories from trusted origins; adopt code-signing or repository allow-listing.
• Change-management: schedule a rapid patch window and validate that tooling integrations remain intact. If KEV or EPSS data becomes available, revise priority accordingly.