Ransomware Group: QILIN

VICTIM NAME: Nissan CBI

NOTE: No files or stolen information are [exfiltrated/downloaded/taken/hosted/seen/reposted/disclosed] by RedPacket Security. Any legal issues relating to the content of the files should be directed at the attackers directly, not RedPacket Security. This blog is simply posting an editorial news post informing that a company has fallen victim to a ransomware attack. RedPacket Security is in no way affiliated or aligned with any ransomware threat actors or groups and will not host infringing content. The information on this page is fully automated and redacted whilst being scraped directly from the QILIN Onion Dark Web Tor Blog page.

AI Generated Summary of the Ransomware Leak Page

On August 20, 2025, Nissan CBI is identified as the victim in a ransomware leak post attributed to the group qilin. The page describes the entity “Nissan Creative Box” as a Tokyo-based design studio that sits within Nissan’s broader design network, located in the Harajuku district. The studio is said to have been established by Shozo Sato and is portrayed as a collaborative, open-format environment with a design team working on various Nissan projects, including concept vehicles and production models. The post frames the incident as a data-leak event rather than a pure encryption, claiming that roughly 4 terabytes of data were copied. This data purportedly encompasses 3D design data, reports, photos, videos, and other documents tied to Nissan CBI’s automobile projects. The attackers threaten that, if Nissan does not acknowledge or engage, they will release the data publicly, potentially exposing detailed project information to competitors and other third parties.

The leak page notes the presence of seven image attachments—thumbnails that appear to depict internal materials and design assets associated with Nissan CBI projects—serving as visual corroboration of the stolen content. It also lists data-exfiltration and contact channels, including a Jabber/XMPP field (with the email redacted) and a TOX identifier, along with an FTP address for data access (credentials redacted in this summary). The combination of a substantial data copy, a threat of public release, and these communication channels is consistent with the double-extortion pattern observed in contemporary ransomware operations.